Schemata by Emmott, Catherine & Alexander, Marc
  
 
 
 
Emmott, C., and Alexander, M. (2014) Schemata. In: Hühn, P., Meister, J. 
C., Pier, J. and Schmid, W. (eds.) Handbook of Narratology, 2nd ed. Series: 
De Gruyter handbook, 1 . de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 756-764. ISBN 
9783110316346 
 
Copyright © 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH 
  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s)  
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/98202/ 
 
 
 
  Deposited on: 22 October 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Schemata 
Catherine Emmott & Marc Alexander 
1 Definition 
Schemata are cognitive structures representing generic knowledge, i.e. 
structures which do not contain information about particular entities, 
instances or events, but rather about their general form. Readers use 
schemata to make sense of events and descriptions by providing default 
background information for comprehension, as it is rare and often un-
necessary for texts to contain all the detail required for them to be fully 
understood. Usually, many or even most of the details are omitted, and 
readers’ schemata compensate for any gaps in the text. As schemata 
represent the knowledge base of individuals, they are often culturally 
and temporally specific, and are ordinarily discussed as collective 
stores of knowledge shared by prototypical members of a given or as-
sumed community. The term was used in the 1930s in both psychology 
and literary theory, but entered wider currency in the 1970s in Artificial 
Intelligence research, later being re-incorporated into psychology and 
thence into linguistics, within the general area of cognitive science. 
2 Explication 
The terms used in this area have historically been highly variable and 
differ across disciplines. The term “schema” is often used as a superor-
dinate label for a broad range of knowledge structures, including 
frames, scenarios, scripts and plans, as described below. “Schema” is 
also used as a synonym for “frame” (Minsky 1975) to refer to mental 
representations of objects, settings or situations. A restaurant sche-
ma/frame, for example, would contain information about types of res-
taurants, what objects are to be found inside a restaurant, and so on. 
The term “scenario” is also sometimes used for situational knowledge 
(Sanford & Garrod 1981). A “script” (Schank & Abelson 1977) is a 
temporally-ordered schema; it describes a reader’s knowledge of stereo-
typical goal-oriented event sequences “that define a well-known situa-
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tion” (422), so that a restaurant script would contain knowledge of the 
actions and sequence of ordering food, paying bills, and so on. In addi-
tion to a sequence of events, most scripts have further “slots” to de-
scribe the “roles” (customers, waiters, chefs, etc.), “props” (menu, ta-
ble, food, money, bill, etc.), “entry conditions” (customer is hungry, 
restaurant has food, etc.) and “results” (customer is no longer hungry, 
restaurant has less food, etc.) within the script. A “plan” (Schank & 
Abelson 1977) consists of knowledge about sets of actions needed to 
accomplish objectives and is used in non-stereotypical situations where 
there is no adequate script available. 
Linguists, psychologists and narrative scholars employ schema theo-
ry to account for the interpretation of a text where the discourse itself 
does not provide all the information necessary for the discourse to be 
processed. Consider the following example: “John went to a restaurant 
for lunch. He ordered a salad, had a coffee and then went to the park for 
a walk.” This short text cannot describe all the actions, activities and 
situational information which a reader requires to comprehend it. 
Schemata and scripts supply the gaps in reader knowledge (that, for 
example, a restaurant is a place which serves food, that food once or-
dered is supplied, and that one must pay before leaving). The general 
notion of gap-filling has long been recognized in literary studies. 
Ingarden ([1931] 1973) refers to “spots of indeterminacy,” an idea later 
adopted by Iser ([1976] 1978), and Sternberg (1978, 1985) discusses 
“expositional gaps.” Research in Artificial Intelligence on schemata 
adds a detailed explanation of how inferences are made by utilizing ge-
neric knowledge in processing specific parts of a text. As schemata are 
situational and socioculturally dependent, some readers may supply 
more information from their schemata than others. 
Schemata are therefore essential for establishing the coherence of a 
text (Toolan → Coherence). Furthermore, schemata are dynamic 
(Schank 1982) to the extent that they accumulate details and are altered 
in the course of experience. If changing circumstances and new events 
contradict existing schemata or make them appear inadequate in a rela-
tively minor way, they can be “tuned” (Rumelhart 1980: 52) to accom-
modate new generalizations. The relationship between texts and sche-
mata is two-way: while schemata tend to lay the ground rules for how a 
discourse will be interpreted, discourses themselves may prompt read-
ers to “tune” existing schemata and create new ones (Rumelhart & 
Norman 1978; Cook 1994: 182–184). 
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3 History of the Concept and its Study 
Some schema researchers (e.g. Cook 1994; Semino 1997) trace the 
philosophical notion of schemata back to Immanuel Kant. Another an-
tecedent is Gestalt theory in psychology (Wertheimer [1923] 1938, 
[1925] 1938; Köhler 1930; Koffka 1935). Also in psychology, Bartlett 
(1932) used the term (which he credits to the earlier work of the neu-
rologist Sir Henry Head) to explain speakers’ unknowing alteration of 
folktale details during retellings, with such alterations being made in 
line with the speakers’ schemata. In literary theory in the 1930s, 
Ingarden ([1931] 1973) argued that there was a stratum of “schematized 
aspects” in the perception of literary works of art. After a lull of many 
years, schema theory re-emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, when sche-
mata were refined within Artificial Intelligence as mental constructs of 
knowledge derived from an individual’s experience and learning (in 
this sense often called “frames,” e.g. Minsky 1975). While scripts were 
first identified by Schank and Abelson (1977), the focus of their work 
was mainly on computational aspects of comprehension. Bower et al. 
(1979) then provided evidence within cognitive psychology that readers 
employed scripts during their processing of a discourse. Later, Schank 
(1982) employed scripts in more detail as dynamic tools for discourse 
processing, breaking scripts down into component parts (Memory Or-
ganization Packets, MOPs) which could be combined into larger struc-
tures when required. 
In narrative studies, schema theory has been important not only for 
its role in explaining gap-filling in reading, as discussed above, but also 
in relation to a reader’s knowledge of the overall structure of stories, 
termed “story schemata” (e.g. Rumelhart 1975; Mandler & Johnson 
1977; Mandler 1984), the cognitive equivalent of text-based story 
grammars. According to their proponents, story schemata contain sets 
of expectations about how stories will continue, although some psy-
chologists (e.g. Black & Wilensky 1979; Johnson-Laird 1983) have 
questioned whether special cognitive structures are required beyond 
general reasoning. Knowledge of the form of texts has also been stud-
ied in the analysis of “super-coherence,” de Beaugrande’s (1987) term 
for thematic awareness, in postulating schemata for specific genres 
(Fludernik 1996; Herman 2002) and in the examination of knowledge 
of intertextual links (Eco 1984; Genette [1982] 1997). 
Schema theory has also been used to construct new theories about 
the nature of narrative. Fludernik (1996) employs it to redefine narrativ-
ity (Abbott → Narrativity), suggesting that cognitive parameters which 
are “constitutive of prototypical human experience” (12) are the main 
  Schemata  759
criteria for what makes a story a story, not action sequences as tradi-
tionally thought. In her model, “there can therefore be narratives with-
out plot, but there cannot be any narratives without a human (anthro-
pomorphic) experiencer” (13). Herman (2002: 85–86) defines 
“narrative-hood,” his term for the difference between narratives and 
non-narratives, using scripts. As scripts represent only stereotypical and 
expected information, the gaps in a text which a script can supply are 
not unique and hence do not produce narratives in their own right. By 
contrast, where a gap cannot be filled by stereotypical information, it 
“focus[es] attention on the unusual and the remarkable” (90) and re-
quires a narrative explanation. For Herman, narrativehood is a binary 
distinction in contrast to the scalar nature of narrativity, the property of 
being more or less prototypically a narrative. He argues (91) that max-
imal narrativity is achieved by balancing the appropriate amount of 
“canonicity and breach,” using Bruner’s (1991) terms. If the majority of 
events in a story are too stereotypical, they will be untellable and/or 
uninteresting, but if events are too unusual, the text may not readily be 
interpreted as a story. Hühn and Kiefer (2005) use the term “eventful-
ness” for deviations from scripts, viewing these deviations as both un-
expected events and instances when an expected event does not occur 
(Hühn → Event and Eventfulness). For them, deviations must be 
judged by viewing sequences in the context of cultural and historical 
factors, using schemata to assess the degree of deviation (see also Hühn 
2010). 
Another important theoretical contribution of schema theory lies in 
discussions of literariness. Cook (1994) has defined “literariness” as 
“discourse deviation,” stating that a narrative acquires literary status 
when it “bring[s] about a change in the schemata of a reader” (182). 
Cook sees literary discourse as “schema refreshing,” meaning that old 
schemata may be destroyed, new ones constructed and that new con-
nections may be made between existing schemata (191), in contrast to 
“schema preserving” or “schema reinforcing” forms of discourse. His 
theory echoes the Russian formalist idea of defamiliarization as an es-
sential aspect of literary writing and comprehending. Cook’s definition 
is controversial because texts which are not literary may nevertheless 
disrupt existing schemata, as Cook himself admits (47, 192) in relation 
to journalism, science writing and conversation. In addition, Semino 
(1997: 175) argues that literary texts can both challenge and confirm 
existing beliefs, suggesting a scale of schema refreshment for those 
which are challenging. This does, however, depend on the historical 
period: during medieval times, confirmation seems to have dominated, 
whereas in modern times deviation is generally more prominent (see 
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Lotman’s ([1970] 1977: 288–296) concepts of “aesthetics of identity 
and opposition”). Jeffries (2001), though, highlights the extent to which 
particular sub-cultures nowadays may still delight in “schema affirma-
tion,” her term for a reader’s “thrill of recognition” of familiar experi-
ence in literary texts. A different perspective on the role of schemata is 
provided by Miall (1989), who argues that it is a reader’s emotions that 
primarily help the reader make sense of a defamiliarizing literary text, 
suggesting that affect is primary in reading and that emotions drive the 
construction of new schemata rather than being an after-effect of cogni-
tive processing. 
One major use of schema theory has been in the description of 
“mind style” (Fowler [1986] 1996) by stylisticians, who use linguistic 
analysis to study the thought representations of characters who have 
difficulty comprehending the world around them, such as primitive 
humans, the mentally impaired, and those alien to a culture (see Semino 
2006 for a summary). Often the technique used by writers is to under-
specify (Emmott 2006) the references to key aspects of the focalizing 
character’s context so that the character’s lack of understanding is con-
veyed, but nevertheless writers still need to give readers enough clues 
to construe the situation by using familiar schemata. Palmer (2004) 
goes beyond the focus on special types of mind style by suggesting that 
all fictional minds need to be cognitively constructed by means of “con-
tinuing-consciousness frames” in order to bring together diverse men-
tions of the thoughts of individual characters and groups of characters 
throughout a story. 
In addition to the above theoretical and descriptive uses, the notion 
of schemata has an extremely wide range of applications in narrative 
studies. In feminist stylistics, Mills (1995: 187–194), has used it to 
challenge the sexist schemata that she claims are needed to read some 
literary texts written by men. In humor studies, oddly incongruous 
frames are often regarded as the source of humor (e.g. Semino 1997; 
Hidalgo-Downing 2000; Simpson 2003; Ermida 2008). In detective and 
mystery stories, clues can be buried by making descriptions heavily 
schema consistent, then subsequently highlighted by adding infor-
mation over and above the schema (Alexander 2006; Emmott et al. 
2010). In the analysis of science fiction (Stockwell 2003) and absurdist 
texts (Semino 1997; Hidalgo-Downing 2000), schema theory can ex-
plain how alternative and bizarre worlds are created. In educational 
psychology, schemata and scripts explain how children develop their 
storytelling and comprehension skills (e.g. McCabe & Peterson eds. 
1991). In film studies (Kuhn & Schmidt → Narration in Film), schema 
theory has been used in discussions of text coherence, genre, and char-
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acter construction (Bordwell 1989: 129–195; Branigan 1992: 1–32). 
This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but gives an indication of 
the importance of schema theory across a number of areas. 
In recent years, the emphasis within the cognitive study of narrative 
has shifted somewhat (Herman → Cognitive Narratology). Schema 
theory is still viewed as important, but there has been a growing interest 
in how a reader needs to supplement general knowledge with the 
knowledge accumulated from the text itself. So readers will normally 
gather together a large store of information about characters and con-
texts as they read a text. Emmott (1997) calls this “text-specific 
knowledge” and argues that readers must not only build mental repre-
sentations (termed “contextual frames”) using this knowledge, but up-
date these representations where necessary and utilize the information 
at later stages in a text. Similar ideas can be found in Gerrig’s (1993) 
examination of narrative worlds, Werth’s (1999) text world theory, and 
Herman’s (2002) study of storyworlds. 
4 Topics for Further Investigation 
(a) The inter-relation between schema knowledge and other knowledge 
(e.g. expert, autobiographical, and text world knowledge) needs to be 
explored further and built into an overall model with empirical testing 
of texts which are more complex than traditional psychological and Ar-
tificial Intelligence materials. (b) More psychological research is need-
ed to establish how generic knowledge derived from the real world is 
utilized in building counterfactual worlds, since the findings from cur-
rent empirical work are not consistent (Nieuwland & van Berkum 2006; 
Ferguson & Sanford 2008; Sanford & Emmott 2012). (c) There needs 
to be additional investigation of how readers use schemata similarly or 
differently in reading factual and fictional texts. (d) Frames based on 
“intertextual knowledge” (Eco 1984; Genette [1982] 1997) need further 
empirical study. 
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